Abstract-Recently, Islam and Biswas proposed an efficient and secure ID-based remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme. We have analyzed the security and performance of Islam and Biswas's scheme and showed that their scheme has some pitfalls. In order to solve these problems, we have constructed an enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme and proven that the proposed scheme is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol in the random oracle and can survive against the known session-specific temporary information attack, channel attack and replay attack, and the user can freely choose and change his password without any hassle of contacting the remote server. As compared with Islam and Biswas's scheme, our scheme has better performance in term of the computation cost, security, communication overhead and communication round. Thus, our scheme is suitable for resource-constrained wireless communication networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
To consider security services in wireless communications, mutual authentication and key agreement are very important mechanisms for preventing server impersonation attack, unauthorized network access and malicious attacks of the subsequent session message. The general approach to construct authentication and key agreement schemes is to adopt the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, the PKI approach is costly to use since it involves certificate revocation, distribution, storage and verification. In order to eliminate the above problem, identity-based cryptography (IBC) was introduced. The main benefit of IBC is in greatly eliminating the need for the public key certificates. But the trusted authority called PKG in IBC can generate the private keys of all its users, so private key escrow becomes an inherent problem in IBC. Moreover, private keys must be sent over secure channels, and this makes secret key distribution a daunting task.
To avoid the problems of conventional PKIs and IBC, a new concept called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] . In CL-PKC, a trusted authority called Key Generation Centre (KGC) issues a partial private key for each user, and each user generates the other part of private key, so when the two parts of private keys are known some cryptographic operations can only be performed. Therefore, CL-PKC not only eliminates the use of certificates, but also solves the key escrow problem. Recently, several certificateless key agreement or authentication schemes were proposed [2, 3] .
Considering the traditional public-key systems require many expensive communication costs and the weak computing capability of mobile devices. In 2006, Das et al. [4] proposed an efficient ID-based remote user authentication scheme with smart cards using bilinear pairings. Goriparthi et al. [5] showed that their scheme is insecure against forgery attack resulting in an adversary can always pass the authentication. Subsequently, Fang et al. [6] proposed an improvement to withstand the mentioned forgery attack. However, Giri and Srivastava [7] pointed out that the Fang et al. ' s scheme cannot overcome off-line attack and they proposed an improved scheme. Unfortunately it was shown by Tseng et al. [8] that the Giri and Srivastava's improvement has too expensive computational cost for smart cards with limited computing capability. In addition, they showed that both [4] and [7] do not provide mutual authentication and key exchange between the user and the server and proposed a solution. In 2009, Goriparthi et al. [9] proposed an improved bilinear pairing based remote client authentication protocol based on Das et al. ' s schme. However, Wu and Tseng [10] showed that schemes [4, 6, 7, 9] do not provide mutual authentication and key exchange between the user and the server, and they proposed a solution using bilinear pairings. As compared with the above client authentication schemes, Wu and Tseng's scheme provides both mutual authentication and key exchange. However, almost all of the above schemes have the bilinear pairings operations, which is not efficient in wireless communications system devices with limited computing capability.
To avoid the problems of bilinear pairings operations, some Identity-based authentication schemes without bilinear pairings on ECC are proposed [11, 12] . However, Yang and Chang [13] point out some of these schemes do not provide the mutual authentication [11] or the key agreement [12] between the user and the server, also they proposed a more efficient ID-based scheme on ECC. Nevertheless, Yoon and Yoo [14] found Yang and Chang's protocol is vulnerable to an impersonation attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy, and then they proposed an improved scheme which is claimed to offer more security attributes. In 2010, Chen et al. [15] found that the Yang and Chang's scheme is vulnerable to insider attack and impersonation attack, and an improvement was made to remove the above drawback. Recently, Islam and Biswas [16] pointed out that the schemes [13, 14, 15] suffer from replay attack/clock synchronization problem, known session-specific temporary information attack many logged-in users' attack, inability to protect user's anonymity, does not provide the session key forward secrecy and does not define how to revoke the authentication key with same identity. To resolve such problems, Islam and Biswas proposed a more efficient and secure ID-based remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices on ECC, also they claimed that they scheme is against the known session-specific temporary information attack.
However, in this paper, firstly, we find that Islam and Biswas's scheme is vulnerable to the known sessionspecific temporary information attack and has some practical security and performance pitfalls including a secure channel needed between the user and the server, the somewhat inefficient three-way challenge-response handshake technique, the relatively inefficient replay attack detection mechanism, no choice of selecting the users' own password. To overcome the security and performance flaws of Islam and Biswas's scheme, we propose an enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices using certificateless public-key cryptography. Compared with Islam and Biswas's scheme, the proposed scheme is more secure, efficient, and practical for mobile devices because the proposed scheme not only eliminates the security flaws of Islam and Biswas's scheme but also reduces the computational costs and communication overheads between the user and the server.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries for elliptic curve group and security definitions are given in the next section. Islam and Biswas's scheme is described in Section 3. Section 4 points out the demerits of Islam and Biswas's scheme. The enhanced scheme is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, security and performance analysis of our scheme is presented. Section 7 gives our conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the mathematical preliminaries required to understand the following remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme are introduced. (a, b) and an integer sÎ F p , the scalar multiplication over E p (a, b) can be defined as follows: sP = P + P + · · · + P(s times). A point P has order n if n · P=O for smallest integer n>0.
The following computational problems defined over G p are assumed to be intractable within polynomial time and those are frequently used to construct secure cryptographic schemes. So far, the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the following computational problems is negligible.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP):
Given a generator P of G p and (aP, bP) for unknown a, bÎ [1, n-1] , the task of CDHP is to compute abP.
III. REVIEW OF ISLAM AND BISWAS'S SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Islam and Biswas's scheme.
A. System Initialization Phase
1) The server S chooses a k-bit prime number p and a base point P with the order n over E p (a, b) .
2) The server S chooses a random number q S (the server's master secret) from [1, n-1] and computes his public key Q S =q S · P.
3) The server S selects two one-way hash functions 
B. User Registration Phase
1) The user U selects his identity ID U and sends it to the remote server S with some personal authentication information through a secure channel.
2) The server S verifies the user U's identity ID U . If the value ID U already exists in the database of the server, S asks the user U for a new identity. Thereafter details of registration message will be checked by the remote server S and computes the authentication key AID U = q S · H 1 (ID U ||X), where XÎ * p Z is randomly chosen by the server S. The remote server S stores the registration information <ID U , X, status-bit> about the user U to a secure database. The remote server S sets the status-bit to "1" if the user is already logged in, otherwise sets to "0".
3) The server S sends the authentication key AID U to the user U through a secure channel. 
C. Mutual Authentication

D. Leaked Key Revocation Phase
Assume that an adversary illegally obtains the user U's authentication key AID U , so the user U should send a request message to the server S for a new authentication key. The user U sends the identity ID U , the old authentication key AID U and some personal authentication information to the remote server S. Next, the server S first verifies the identity ID U . After successfully validating user's credential, the remote server S randomly chooses another number * p X Z ∈ and computes the new authentication key U AID =q S · H 1 (ID U || X ) with the same identity ID U . It is to be pointed out that the authentication key revocation does not need a new identity of the user U, only the value X will be modified in each revocation phase. The server S sends the fresh authentication key U AID through a secure channel to the user U. The remote server stores the database same identity ID U except that X is exchanged by X .
IV. DEMERITS OF ISLAM AND BISWAS'S SCHEME
In this section, the security and performance of Islam and Biswas's scheme are analyzed carefully. Islam and Biswas state that the known session-specific temporary information (KSSTI) attack is infeasible in their scheme. However, in this section, we show that their scheme is insecure against the KSSTI attack. Also we find some security and performance pitfalls including a secure channel needed between the user and the server, the somewhat inefficient three-way challenge-response handshake technique, the relatively inefficient replay attack detection mechanism, no choice of selecting the users' own password.
A. Known Session-Specific Temporary Information Attack
Known session-specific temporary information attack means if the session short-lived secrets are leaked but from this disclosure, secrecy of generated session key should not be compromised. In the Islam and Biswas's scheme, the server and the user compute the same session key SK=kdf(ID U ||AID U ||K), where K=r U · S= r S · R=r U · r S · P. Now if the session ephemeral secrets r U and r S are disclosed to an adversary by some means then he can compute the session key SK through the followings steps.
1) In the mutual authentication with key session agreement phase, we assume that the adversary, eavesdropping on the channel, has obtained all the messages exchanged in that session phase including <CID U , N=R+AID U , M> and <T=R * +S, H S >, where R= r U · P and S=r S · P.
2) The adversary can computes R= r U · P and AID U =N-R with knowing the session ephemeral secrets r U and N, or he can computes S=r S · P, R =T-S and AID U =N-R with knowing the session ephemeral secrets r S , T and N.
3) The adversary can computes K=r U · r S · P and the session key SK=kdf(ID U ||AID U ||K). Hence, we conclude that the Islam and Biswas's scheme does prevent the known session-specific temporary information attack.
B. Secure Channel Needed Between The User And The Server
In the user registration phase of the Islam and Biswas's scheme, the user U chooses his identity ID U and submits it to the server S with some personal secret information through a secure channel, and the server S returns the authentication key AID U to U through secure channel. In the leaked key revocation phase of the Islam and Biswas's scheme, the server S returns the new authentication key U AID to the user U through a secure channel. Thus, the authentication key escrow and distribution become a daunting task in they scheme. Moreover, using this secure channel will be facing some security risks, such as if this secure channel is broken, the adversary can obtain the user's identity ID U , authentication key AID U and some personal secret information, which makes the Islam and Biswas's scheme does not preserve the anonymity of the user and the security of the user's authentication key.
C. Three-Way Challenge-Response Handshake Technique
The Islam and Biswas's scheme follows the three-way challenge-response handshake technique to provide the mutual authentication with session key agreement. This technique is not efficient, since the two-way challengeresponse technique can be used to achieve this security target. Moreover, in their proposed scheme, the user authenticates the server first then the server authenticates the user, which is not a case in real-life applications. Usually, the server authenticates the user first then the user authenticates the server.
D. Inefficient Replay Attack Detection Mechanism
Assume that an adversary may replay the old message <CID U , N, M> in the step 1 of mutual authentication phase to impersonate a legal user U for the Islam and Biswas's scheme. However, only when the mutual authentication phase is performed to the fifth step, this attack can be detected. That is to say, the unwanted computational costs of four steps need to be performed in mutual authentication phase before the replay attack is detected.
E. No Choice Of Selecting The Users' Own Password
In Islam and Biswas's scheme, the user's authentication key is entirely generated by the remote server S and the user has no choice of selecting his own password, this situation is not a sound case in real-life applications, e.g. digital library, M-commerce, online banking, etc. Secondly, the user's authentication key AID U chosen by the remote server could be random and long (for example, 512 or 1024 bits), which could be difficult for a user to key correctly this value into the mobile device and remember these numbers easily. Thirdly, when a user wants to change its secret key, he can only submit the key change request to the remote server S through a secure channel, which brings some inconveniences to the user and server.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we propose an enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices using certificateless public-key cryptography to overcome the weaknesses of Islam and Biswas's scheme.
A. System Initialization Phase
2) The server S chooses a random number q S as its own private key from [1, n-1] and computes the corresponding public key Q S =q S · P.
3) The server S selects four one-way secure hash functions 
B. Password Generation Phase
This phase is executed by the user U with the system parameters. The user U selects a random number s U as his password from [1, n-1] and computes the corresponding public information PK U = s U · P.
C. User Registration Phase
In order to avoid the authentication key escrow and distribution problem, and preserve the anonymity of the user and the security of the user's authentication key in an open channel, we design a more secure user registration phase by introducing some modifications to the Islam and Biswas's scheme. In the following, we explain the user registration phase in four steps.
1) The user U first selects his identity ID U ={0, 1} p , computes K 1 =s U · Q S and RG U =ID U ⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ), then submits the register information <RG U , PK U > to the server S through an open channel.
2) The server S computes K 1 = q S ·PK U and ID U =RG U ⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ), verifies the user U's identity ID U . If the value ID U already exists in the database of the server, S asks the user U for a new identity. Thereafter details of registration message will be checked by the remote server S and computes the user U's public key Q U =H 2 (ID U , X) and private key D U =q S ·Q U , where X ∈ * p Z is randomly chosen by the server S. The remote server S stores the registration information <ID U , X, status-bit> about the user U to a secure database. The remote server S sets the status-bit to "1" if the user is already logged in, otherwise sets to "0".
3) The server S computes RQ U =(X||Q U ||D U )⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ) and returns it to U through an open channel.
4) The user U computes (X||Q U ||D U )=RQ U ⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ), and obtains his public/private key pair (Q U , D U ).
D. Mutual Authentication With Session Key Agreement Phase
In order to achieve the mutual authentication with key session agreement, the Islam and Biswas's follows the three-way challenge-response handshake technique, but the proposed scheme follows the more efficient two-way challenge-response handshake technique. Assume that the message communication is over an open channel in this phase. Initially, the user U enters his identity ID U and the password s U into the mobile device, the device computes Q'=H 2 (ID U , X) and PK'=s U P, and then checks if Q'=Q U and PK'=PK U . If they are incorrect, terminates the operation, otherwise, the mutual authentication with session key agreement phase is performed as follows. 3
) Upon receiving the authentication message <T S , T, MAC k (ID U , T S , T)> at time T 2 . The user U verifies the validity of the time interval between T S and T 2 for transmission delay. If T S is valid, the user authenticates the service server S by checking the integrity of MAC k (ID U , T S , T)
with the key k. U will quit the current session if the check produces a negative result. Otherwise, the user U computes K 2 =(x+1)T=(x+1)(y+1)Q U and the session key MK=kdf(ID U , T U , T S , R, T, K 1 , K 2 ).
E. Password Change Phase
The password change phase does not need any interaction with the remote server. This phase can be invoked whenever the user U wants to perform this operation and works as following steps:
1) The user U enters his identity ID U and the password s U into the mobile device. The device device computes Q'=H 2 (ID U , X) and PK'=s U P, and then checks if Q'=Q U and PK'=PK U . If they are incorrect, it terminates the operation, otherwise, continues next step,.
2) The mobile device allows user U to submits a fresh password ' 
F. Leaked Key Revocation Phase
Assume that an adversary illegally obtains the user U's private key D U , so the user U should send a request message to the server S for a new private key. The user U computes RG U =(ID U ||D U )⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ) and submits the register information <RG U , PK U > to the server S through an open channel. After receiving the register information, the server S computes (ID U ||D U )=RG U ⊕H 1 (K 1 , PK U ) and verifies the identity ID U . After successfully validating user's credential, the remote server S randomly chooses another number 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis
In the security model of certificateless public key cryptography defined by Al-Riyami and Paterson, there are two kinds of adversaries:
Type I Adversary: A 1 cannot obtain the master private key of server but can replace the public information PK U of any entity with a value chosen by himself.
Type II Adversary: A 2 can obtain the master private key of server but cannot perform public information replacement.
Here, we show that the proposed scheme is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol under the random oracle model in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol under the random oracle model, Specifically, suppose the adversary A i(i=1,2) against the scheme with non-negligible probability Adv(A i ) and in the attack kdf has been queried q h times at most and q n oracles have been created. Then there exists a challenger C solve the CDH problem with an advantage 2 ( )/( X, w) . If the requested input is already on the list, then the corresponding Q U = wP is returned, otherwise C chooses a random number w∈ * p Z and sets Q U =wP, then C will puts the tuple (ID U , X, w) in list L 2 and answers Q U ..
If such an element is found, C answers h 3 , otherwise he answers A i with a random binary sequence h 3 ∈ * p Z and puts the (
If such an element is found, C answers h 4 , otherwise he answers A i with a random binary sequence h 4 ∈ * p Z and puts the (
If such an element is found, C answers kdf, otherwise he answers A i with a random binary sequence kdf ∈ * p Z and puts the (ID U , T U , T S , R, T,
Send queries: On a Send query, we have three cases to consider as follows. 
from L k and returns δ as the answer to the CDHP challenge. Now we estimate the probability that C does not fail, namely Event 1, 2 and 3 do not happen. As can be seen from the above game, if the test session is between the t -th and υ -th oracle, then the game goes through. The probability that the game has chosen the right session is
n n× -, since a randomly chosen oracle is 1/q n and the other randomly chosen oracle in remaining oracles is 1/(q n -1). We have: Adv(C does not fail) >1/ ( ( 1) 
B. Other Security Properties
Next, we will heuristically argue that enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices using certificateless public-key cryptography satisfies the following security properties.
1) Known session-specific temporary information attack: Compromising the ephemeral private keys of a session does not enable an attacker to compute the session key. Specifically, obtaining the keys x and y in any session between user ID U and server S, allows the attacker to compute K 2 =xT=yR=xyQ U . However, in order to compute MK=kdf(ID U , T U , T S , R, T, K 1 , K 2 ), the attacker needs to obtain K 1 = s U ·Q S =q S ·PK U , hence he must know at least one long-term private key s U or q S . Given PK U =s U P or Q S =q S P, it is hard to compute s U or q S under the assumption of DLP. Therefore, known sessionspecific temporary information attack is infeasible in our proposed scheme.
2) Channel attack: In our scheme, user and server do not need a secure channel to transmit the exchange messages in the user registration phase, password change phase and leaked key revocation phase. Moreover, our scheme eliminates the key escrow and distribution problem, also the anonymity of the user and the security of the user's authentication key can be achieved in the open channel. Therefore, the proposed scheme can survive against the channel attack.
3) Replay attack: Our scheme can withstand replay attack and this type of attack can be detected in the first step of the mutual authentication with key agreement phase between the user and server because the authenticity of two authentication messages MAC k (CID U , T U , R, S) and MAC k (ID U , T S , T) is firstly verified by checking the freshness of time stamps T U and T S , respectively. 4) Secure password change: In the presented scheme, the mobile device holder can freely choose and change his password without any hassle of contacting the remote server S. Also, the password chosen by user is easier to remember than the authentication key chosen by server. Any other person, even having stolen or get the mobile device cannot change or update the password without knowing the corresponding valid ID U and s U of the mobile device. 5) Mutual authentication: Suppose that an attacker wants to deceive server S into thinking he is the user ID U , he needs to know k=H 4 
, but he can't compute the K 1 =s U ·Q S =q S ·PK U without user's password s U or server's private key q S under the assumption of CDHP, thus none other than server S and user ID U can compute the value MAC and thus server S can authenticate user ID U by verifying the value MAC, Similarly, user ID U can authenticate server S in the same way. So, our scheme achieve mutual authentication between user and server with the two-way challenge-response handshake technique, where the server authenticates the user first then the user authenticates the server.
C. Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our scheme with Islam and Biswas's scheme in terms of computation cost (not including precomputation cost), security, communication overhead and communication round in Table 1 . We use the following notations to analyze the efficiency.
• PM, PA is the computation cost for point multiplication and point addition/subtraction respectively.
• KSSTIA, CAK, SPC is the abbreviation for known session-specific temporary information attack, channel attack and secure password change respectively.
• Y and N denote that whether satisfy this security property.
As shown in the Table 1 , Islam and Biswas's scheme cannot survive against the known session-specific temporary information attack and channel attack, and cannot achieve secure password change. Our scheme eliminates these security shortcomings. Although Islam and Biswas's scheme has less computation cost in the registration phase, their scheme needs a secure channel to transmit the exchange messages and does not consider the anonymity of the user in this phase, and they scheme requires one additional point multiplication computation than ours in terms of the total computation cost. Compared with their scheme, our scheme not only enjoys less computation cost, communication overhead and communication round, but also has higher security level. Hence, consider the communication security and mobile devices with limited computing capability it may be that our enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme is more applicable.
Ⅶ. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the security and performance of Islam and Biswas's scheme and showed that their scheme has some security and performance pitfalls. In order to solve these problems, we have constructed an enhanced ECC remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices using certificateless public-key cryptography and proven that the proposed scheme is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol in the random oracle and can survive against the known session-specific temporary information attack, channel attack and replay attack, also satisfies mutual authentication and the mobile device holder can freely choose and change his password without any hassle of contacting the remote server in our scheme. By exploiting the certificateless public key cryptography system, our scheme successfully eliminates the key escrow issue which is inherent in identity-based cryptography. As compared with Islam and Biswas's scheme, our scheme has better performance in term of the computation cost, security, communication overhead and communication round. Thus, our scheme is more suitable for resource-constrained wireless communication networks.
